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This article outlines the most important developments in key areas of antitrust enforce-
ment in fourteen selected jurisdictions during 2013.1 Prepared by antitrust law practition-
ers and the International Antitrust Law Committee, this article summarizes a more
detailed publication to be released in spring 2014 covering antitrust developments in more
than thirty jurisdictions worldwide.2
I. Australia
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There have been no relevant amendments to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
(CCA) in 2013. However, the recently elected Liberal-National Party coalition have
committed to a "root and branch" review of competition law in the first 100 days of their
term. The relevant minister has criticized the operation of competition laws in Australia,
particularly the misuse of market power provisions, which he has described as a "hunting
dog that won't leave the porch."3
1. For developments during 2012, see Maria Cecilia Andrade et al., InternationalAntitrust, 47 INT'L LAW.
41 (2012). For developments during 2011, see Maria Cecilia Andrade et al., Internationa/Ant itrst, 46 INT'L
LAW. 41 (2011).
2. This 2013 report will be available online at http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=
IC722000.
3. Anna Vidot, Minister Wants Competition Law With Bite, ABC RULTRAL NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www
.abc.net.au/news/2013 -10-30/food-and-grocery-foruim-competinon-law/5057728.
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B. MERGERS
While many of the merger reviews in 2013 have received strong media interest, only
two proposed acquisitions have been opposed by the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission (ACCC). These opposed mergers involved the proposed acquisition
of a supplier of infant food by its major competitor 4 and a proposed acquisition of a super-
market site by a major supermarket chain in western Sydney.' The ACCC has recently
released an updated version of its Informal Merger Process Guidelines, which sets out the
procedure for the most widely used process for obtaining merger clearance in Australia.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The ACCC has stated that, as of September 2013, it "has more than twenty current in-
depth cartel investigations or matters before the courts." 6
The ACCC has continued to pursue proceedings against airlines relating to an alleged
price fixing cartel for air freight services. The ACCC has also successfilly prosecuted a
Japanese cable supplier for cartel conduct,7 a concrete company for entering into anti-
competitive arrangements, 8 and a supplier of bearing products for entering into two sepa-
rate cartel arrangements. 9 In a private action seeking damages under the CCA, the Fed-
eral Court took a wide view of whether two parties were competitors and found that a
company, as well as its chairman (a former Premier of New South Wales) and its chief
executive, had breached the bid rigging prohibitions 0 The orders, however, were later
set aside following a settlement between the parties.
The ACCC has announced that it is reviewing its immunity policy for cartel conduct
and has issued a discussion paper."
D. ABUSES OF A DOMINANT POSITION
In a clear case of the ACCC not shying away from difficult and high profile litigation, it
has commenced proceedings against Visa Inc. and a number of related entities, alleging
breaches of misuse of market power and exclusive dealing prohibitions in relation to dy-
4. Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n, ACCC to Oppose Proposed Acquisition of
Rafferty's Garden (June 6, 2013), http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-to-oppose-proposed-acquisi
tion-of-raffertys-garden.
5. Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n, ACCC to Oppose Woolworths' Proposed
Acquisition of Glenmore Ridge Site, (June 6, 2013), http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-to-oppose-
woolworths-proposed-acquisition-of-glenmore-ridge-site.
6. Id.
7. Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm'n v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia S.R.L. (No. 5) [2013]
FCA 294 (Austl.).
8. Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm'n v Cement Austl Pty. Ltd. & Ors. [2013] FCA 909 (Austl.),
avazilahe at http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/cases/2013cement.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
9. Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm'n v Koyo Austl Pty. Ltd. [2013] FCA 1051 (Austl.).
10. Norcast S.ar.L v. Bradken Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 235 (Austl.).
11. Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n, ACCC Releases Discussion Paper in Cartel
mmunity Policy Review (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-releases-discussion-pa
per -in- cartel-immunity-policy-review.
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namic currency conversion services. 12 Following media interest, the ACCC has also con-
firmed that it is investigating the major supermarket chains, Coles and Woolworths, for
various breaches of the CCA in relation to their dealings with suppliers.13
II. Brazil
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
After the first year of effectiveness of the New Antitrust Law No.12.529/11,14 it can be
concluded that the pre-merger notification system reduced the time in which the Admin-
istrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) issues its decisions. Now, the average
time for reviewing mergers under the fast track procedure (available for cases in which
vertical integration or horizontal overlap is below 20 percent) is nineteen days and under
ordinary proceedings is sixty-one days, compared to 154 days under Law No.8.884/94.15
Law No. 12.846/13,16 the New Brazilian Anticorruption Law (applicable, e.g. to bid
rigging), contemplates fines that may vary from 0.1 percent to 20 percent of the gross sales
of the companies involved in the last fiscal year preceding the initiation of the
investigation.
B. MERGERS
CADE's Tribunal subjected the approval of two transactions 17 to a Merger Control
Agreement, 18 in cooperation with the European Commission.
For the first time, the practice of gun jumping was reviewed by CADE in the case of
OGX's acquisition of 40 percent of the participation of Petrobras in an oil block located in
the Santos Basin. OGX agreed to pay BRL 3 million (U.S. $1.4 million).19
12. Sharon Henrick, ACCC Takes on Visa, KING AND WOOD MALLESONS (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.malle
sons.com/publications/marketAlerts/2013/Pages/ACCC-takes-on-Visa.aspx.
13. Malcolm Maiden, Coles, Woolies Could be Facing Some Heartburn, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 15,
2014, at 6, available at http://www.smh.com.au/business/coles-woolies-could-be-facing-some-hearthmrn
20130214-2 eg 1.html.
14. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DiAxmo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 12.1.2011
(Braz.), translation available at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/AW /20N C2 /BA / 2012 529 o 20201100
20%28English%20version%20from%2018%2005%202012%29.pdf.
15. Lei No. 8.884 de 11 de Jrnho de 1994, DiAnio OFICAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 13.6.1994 (Braz.),
translation available at http://www.cade.gov.br/english/internacional/Law-8884-1994b.pdf.
16. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DiAxmo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013, available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2011- 2014/2013/Lei/L12846.htm.
17. Parecer Tecnico No. 109, Ato de Concentraqao No. 08700.009882/2012-35, Mnskj6 AB e Ahsltrom
Corporation, SuperintendEncia-Geral, Coordenaqao-Geral de Analise Antitruste 3 (May 28, 2013) (Braz.);
Parecer Tecnico No. 125/2013, Ato de Concentragao No. 08700.006437/2012-13, Syniverse Holdings, Inc. e
WP Roaming III S.A.R.L., SuperintendEncia-Geral, Coordenaqao-Geral de Analise Antitrnste 4 (May 2,
2013) (Braz.).
18. Agreement entered into by CADE and the parties involved in the transactions approved with restric-
tions, providing structural or behavioral commitments.
19. Parecer Tecnico No. 182, Ato de Concentragao No. 08700.005775/2013-19, OGX Petr6leo e Gas e
Petroleo Brasileiro S/A, Advocacia-Geral du Uniao, Procuradorio-Geral Federal, Procuradorio Federal Es-
pecializada Junto AO CADE (july 24, 2013) (Braz.).
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
On March 20, 2013, CADE fined the Central Office of Collection and Distribution
(ECAD), a musical artists' copyright collection agency, for cartel activity, jointly with six
associations representing copyright holders. The fines imposed amounted to roughly
BRL 38 million (U.S. $19 million).20
On July 4, 2013, CADE's General Superintendence (GS) carried out raids at the head-
quarters of thirteen companies in the rail construction and metro lines markets.2  The
ongoing investigation was prompted by a leniency application filed by Siemens indicating
the existence of bid rigging.
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
On July 17, 2013, GS initiated an administrative proceeding aimed at investigating an
alleged abuse of dominance in the market of stainless steel,22 and on October 11, 2013
three administrative proceedings addressed to investigating potential anticompetitive
practices carried out by Google in the Brazilian market of online searches.2 3
E. COURT DECISIONS
On September 25, 2013, a federal judge substantially reduced the fines imposed by
CADE on ECAD (for a reference to the case, please see point C above) and six associa-
tions representing musicians, for alleged cartel practices. The fines were reduced from
roughly BRL 38 million to roughly BRL 3 million24
III. Canada
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There were no significant legislative changes in 2013. But the Competition Bureau (the
Bureau) published revised Immunity and Leniency Program Frequently Asked Questions
documents, providing further guidance on the Bureau's approach. 2  The Bureau also
20. Parecer Tecnico No. 309/2011, Processo Administrativo No. 08012.003745/2010-83, Associaqao
Brasileira de Televisao por Assinatura, Advocacia-Geral du Uniao, Procuradorio-Geral Federal, Procuradorio
Federal Especializada Junto AO CADE (Aug., 2011) (Braz.).
21. Samantha Pearson, Brazil Casts Net Over Transport Groups in Cartel Probe, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft
.com/cms/s/0/b5d824d6-ed9f-1 e2 -8d7 c-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2sHk669rz.
22. Nota Tecnica No. 254/2013, Processo Administrativeo No. 08700.010789/2012-73, APERAM Inox
America do Sul S.A., Superintendencia-Geral, Coordenagao-Geral de Analise Antitruste 3 (Jul. 16, 2013)
(Braz.).
23. Nota Tecnica No. 349/2013, Procedimento Administrativeo No. 08012.010483/2011-94, Google Inc.
e Google Brasil Internet Ltda., Superintendencia-Geral, Coordenaqao-Geral de Analise Antitruste 01 (Oct.
10, 2013) (Braz.).
24. CADE filed a clarification motion against the decision. Pending judgment before the First Federal
District Court. (Lawsuit No. 27455-03.2013.4.01.3400).
25. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Publishes Revised Immunity and Len-
ency FAQs (Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://www.competionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03609
.hrml.
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launched its criminal cartel whistle blowing initiative in May 2013, encouraging the public
and businesses to provide information about possible criminal cartels. 26
B. MERGERS
The Bureau entered into a number of consent agreements in 2013. One, in March,
involved the acquisition of Astral Media by BCE and required the divestiture of a signifi-
cant number of television channels. Remedies (largely divestitures) were also required in
several retail mergers, including Cineplex's acquisition of Empire's movie theaters, 27
Safeway grocery's acquisition by Sobeys, 28 Viterra's agri-products business sale to
Agrium, 29 and La Coop federee's proposed acquisition of a minority interest in Groupe
BMR 30 (regarding hardware and building materials).
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Bureau was active against price fixing and bid rigging. It obtained convictions re-
lated to price fixing in the retail gas sector. 31 Charges were laid against Nestle, Mars, and
ITWAL (a national network of independent wholesale distributors), as well as three indi-
viduals, for price fixing.32 Also, a Japanese supplier of motor vehicle components was
fined CAN $30 million for its role in an international bid-rigging conspiracy. 33
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The Commissioner of Competition lost an abuse of dominance case and a retail price
maintenance action. The Competition Tribunal rejected the abuse application challeng-
ing rules of the Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB), which restrict how its members com-
municate information about listings to customers. The Tribunal ruled that TREB, an
incorporated trade association, does not compete with its own members in the real estate
brokerage market and therefore did not contravene the abuse of dominance provision.
26. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Launches Whistleblowing Initiative
(May 28, 2013), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03573.html.
27. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Concerns Result in Changes to Pro-
posed Movie Theater Merger (Oct. 10, 2013), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/03617.html.
28. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Requires Significant Divestiture in
Sobeys/Safeway Deal (Oct. 22, 2013), availahie at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
03618.html.
29. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Secures Remedy in Sale of Agri-Prod-
ncts Business to Agrium (Sept. 5, 2013), availahie at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/
eng/03601.html.
30. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Agreement Preserves Competition in the Retail Sale of Hard-
ware Products and Building Materials in Rural Quebec (Nov. 1, 2013), availahie at http://www.competition
bureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/0362 5.html.
31. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Three Individuals Sentenced in Quebec Gas Cartel (Aug. 16,
2013), availahie at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03 591.html.
32. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Charges Laid in a Price-Fixing Cartel in the Chocolate In-
dustry (june 6, 2013), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03569.html.
33. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Record $30M Fine Obtained by Competition Bureau Against
Japanese Auto Parts Supplier (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/03560.html.
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The decision followed earlier interpretations that an anticompetitive act must be one in-
tended to have a negative impact on a competitor. The Commissioner has appealed. 34
Regarding price maintenance, in June 2013, the Competition Tribunal dismissed the
Commissioner's application against Visa and MasterCard regarding "merchant restric-
tions." 35 This decision too was based on a technical interpretation of the provision rather
than whether the impugned practice had anticompetitive effects.
E. COURT DECISIONS
The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed an appeal that awarded significant damages in a
private lawsuit alleging an agreement by Husky Oil Operations and Exxon Mobil to use a
single fluid hauling service provider for their jointly and separately owned facilities. The
Court determined that the conduct was not covered by Section 45, the criminal cartel
provision. 36
Most of the Commissioner's deceptive marketing allegations against one of Canada's
major wireless communications companies, Rogers Communications, were dismissed by
the Ontario Superior Court.37 The Court did confirm, however, the constitutionality of
significant administrative monetary penalties for deceptive marketing practices. The
plaintiff has applied to the Supreme Court of Canada for leave to appeal. 38
The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in Tervita Corporation, et al. v.
Commissioner of Competition, 39 in which the Commissioner successfilly argued that a trans-
action would lead to a substantial prevention of competition in the hazardous waste dispo-
sal market. Tervita is the Commissioner's first court challenge of a merger since 2005 and
the first case involving a non-notifiable merger.40
IV. China
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 2013, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued several
rules under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), including (i) the Evidence Rules for
Price-Related Administrative Penalties, specifying the rules and procedures for the collec-
tion, review, and evaluation of evidence during NDRC investigations and (ii) the Rules on
Handling and Review of Cases on Price-Related Administrative Penalties, specifying the
34. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Appeals Competition Tribunal Ruling
in Toronto Real Estate Board Case (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/
cb-bc.nsf/eng/03567.html.
35. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Will Not Appeal Credit Cards Decision
(Sept. 30, 2013), availahle at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03614.html.
36. See 321665 Alberta Ltd. v. Husky Oil Operations, 2013 ABCA 221 (Can. Alta. CA).
37. See Canada (Competition Bureau) v. Chatr Wireless Inc., 2013 ONSC 5315 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
38. See Docket: 35529, 321665, Alberta Ltd. v. Husky Oil Operations Ltd., et al., SUPREME CT. OF CAN. (Dec.
3, 2012), http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=35529.
39. See Docket: 35314, Tervita Corporation, et al. v. Commissioner of Competition, SUPREME CT. OF CAN. (Dec.
3, 2012), http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=35314.
40. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Federal Court of Appeal Decision Clears the Way for Re-
stored Competition in Hazardous Waste Disposal Market (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://www.competi
tionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03 535.html.
VOL. 48
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTITRUST 45
rules and procedures for handling and reviewing price-related cases after investigation and
before making final penalty decisions. 4 1 The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) pub-
lished two draft rules for public comments, one fleshing out procedures for imposing and
implementing merger remedies42 and the other listing the types of transactions eligible for
simplified review. 43 The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the
agency responsible for non-price non-merger antitrust enforcement in China, is under-
stood to have been drafting rules on issues at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual
property rights (IPRs) but has not yet published any official draft for public comments.
B. MERGERS
So far during 2013, MOFCOM has imposed conditions in four cases, (i) Glencorel
Xstrata: MOFCOM required Glencore to divest its ownership interest in a copper project
being developed by Xstrata and the parties to continue to offer to supply Chinese custom-
ers on the same terms using long-term contracts, including setting minimum volume and
benchmark pricing for copper concentrate; (ii) Marubeni/Gavilon: MOFCOM required the
parties to hold separate their soybean export businesses to China for two years; (iii) Baxter!
Gambro: MOFCOM required Baxter to divest its global Continuous Renal Replacement
Therapy business and to gradually terminate the China portion of an OEM supply agree-
ment with competitor Nipro relating to hemodialysis filters; and (iv) Mediatek/MStar:
MOFCOM required the parties to hold separate their liquid crystal panel display (LCD)
television semiconductor chip business with Mediatek, which was entitled only to very
limited shareholder rights such as receiving dividends.44
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The NDRC and its local branches (DRCs) investigated and issued monetary fines in
several cases, including (i) the highest fine in China's AML history, totaling RMB 669
million, imposed on six milk powder manufacturers for resale price maintenance (RPM)
(three companies were exempted from fines based on their voluntary submission of evi-
dence, cooperation during investigation, and active correction of their business prac-
tices); 45 (ii) six global LCD manufacturers were fined a total of RMB 144 million plus
confiscation of RMB 36.75 million in illegal gains and restitution of RMB 172 million in
41. Jiage Xingzheng Chufa Anjian Shenli Shencha Guize (it ' Z 4iS') I)j) [Rules on
Handling and Reviewing Cases on Price-Related Administrative Penalties] (promulgated by the National
Development and Reform Commission, Sept. 30, 2013, effective Jan. 1, 2014) (China), available at http://
www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/zcfg/201310/t20131017562815 .html.
42. On Business Concentration Restrictive Conditions Attached Provisions (draft) for Public Comment
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Mar. 27, 2013), available at
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201303/20130300068492 .shtml.
43. Focus on the Simple Case of Operators Interim Provision Applicable Standard (draft) for Public Com-
ment (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 3, 2013), availahie
at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201304/20130400076870.shtml.
44. See Press Release, Ministry of Commerce of China, Announcement No. 61 of 2013 (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://file.mofcom.gov.cn/search.shrnl?file-cate= 17.
45. See Press Release, Nat'l Dev. and Reform Comm'n, Synbiotics and Other Milk Producers in Violation
of "Anti-Monopoly" of Restricting Competition be Punished 6.6873 One Hundred Million Yuan (Aug. 7,
2013).
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customer overpayments due to the illegal price manipulation; 46 and (iii) two China luxury
liquor manufacturers were each fined over RMB 200 million for RPM restraints on
distributors.
47
So far, penalties in thirteen cases have been publicized by SAIC, mostly involving car-
tels. These include the following two cases this year: (i) a provincial tourism association
was fined RMB 400,000,48 with other participating companies also sanctioned between
RMB 1 and 3 million each for price collusion and other price manipulation 49 and (ii) three
local brick and tile manufacturers in a city-wide cartel were fined a total of RMB 1.06
million. 0 In addition, press releases have indicated another dozen competition-related
cases now under SAIC investigation,5 ' including Tetra Pak for alleged abuse of dominance
by tying its technological advantage in the liquid food packaging market to the sales of
packing materials, as well as for other discriminatory conduct.5 2
D. COURT DECISIONS
The courts issued judgments in several prominent AML cases in 2013.
(i) 360 vs. QQ. The Guangdong Higher Court denied 360's claim against QQ for abuse
of dominant market position by way of refusals to deal and illegal tying or bundling of
sales. In the ruling, the Court defined a global relevant market and found that QQ did
not have monopoly power in that market, given fierce competition with other social media
outlets such as Weibo (a Chinese provider similar to a Twitter-Facebook hybrid). Thus,
the Court denied 360's RMB 150 million compensation claim as unsubstantiated and re-
quired 360 to pay RMB 796,800 to QQ for litigation costs.5 3
(ii) Rainbow vs Johnson & Johnson. The Shanghai Higher Court overturned a first in-
stance ruling in this case, ordering Johnson & Johnson (J&J) to pay RVIB 530,000 to
46. See Press Release, Nat'l Dev. and Reform Comm'n, Six Foreign Enterprises Investigated and Penalized
for Monopolizing the Price of LCD Panels (Jan. 4, 2013).
47. Cathy Lin & Yang Ning, Whats Wrong With High Spirits?-Moutai and Wuliangye Got Fined for Vertical
Monopoly Behaviors, Lexology (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d766eO5d-81e5-
4dcc-a5ac-d001c0c2 1d3e; Zhou Rui, Guizhou, Maotai Price Monopoly Bureau Announced Ticket Fined 247 Mil-
lion, CHINA NEWS (Feb. 22, 2013, 4:22 PM), available at http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2013/02-22/
4588648.shtml.
48. Press Release, State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce of China, Competition Law Enforcement, Bulle-
tin No. 12 of 2013, Xishuangbanna, Yunnan Tourism Association, Association of Xishuangbanna Travel In-
dustry Operators Engaged in the Case of a Monopoly Agreement (July 29, 2013), http://www.saic.gov.cn/
zwgk/gggs/jzzf/201307 /t20130 26_1367 68.html.
49. See Press Release, Nat'l Dev. Reform Comm'n, Price Violations Disturbing the Order of Tourist Mar-
ket were Severely Penalized (Sept. 29, 2013).
50. See Press Release, State Admin. of Indus. & Commerce of China, Competition Law Enforcement Bul-
letin No. 11 of 2013, Case Against Monopoly Agreements by Industry Operators Organized Under the Aus-
pices of Brick and Tile Association of City of Yi Bin in Sichuan Province (July 29, 2013), available at http://
www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/201307/t20130726 136767.html.
51. See Press Release, State Admin. of Indus. & Commerce of China, Sword Care Enforcement Fairness-A
Summary of Antitrust Enforcement AICs (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.saic.gov.cn/jgzf. ./fldyfbzljz/201308/
t20130828_137651.html.
52. See Press Release, State Admin. of Indus. & Commerce of China, Investigation was Initiated Against
Tetra Pak for being Suspected of Abusing Market Dominance (July 10, 2013), http://www.saic.gov.cn/ywdt/
gsyw/zjyw/xxb/201307/t20130714_136373.html.
53. Beijing Qihoo Tech. Co. v. Tencent Tech. (Shenzhen) Co., at 30 (Guangdong Provincial Higher Peo-
ple's Ct. Mar. 20, 2013).
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Rainbow, a former distributor that had been terminated for violating J&J's RPM require-
ments.5 4 The court decision found that RPM was not per se illegal, but that given J&J's
market position and its control over prices in the suture market (in which prices remained
unchanged for fifteen years), the RPM restrictions in J&J's distribution agreement had
anti-competitive effects with no obvious benefits and thus were illegal.
(iii) Huawei vs. Interdigital The Guangdong Higher Court confirmed a judgment of the
Shenzhen Intermediate Court finding Interdigital liable for abuse of dominance arising
out of unfairly high pricing and improper tying or bundling in the licensing of its stan-




In 2013, the European Commission (EC) issued its proposal for legislation to facilitate
damages claims by alleged victims of antitrust violations56 The EC also continued its
review of the rules for technology transfers 7 and considered extending the merger notifi-
cation system also to the acquisitions of minority shareholdings.' 8
B. MERGERS
The EC blocked UPS's proposed acquisition of rival TNT Express, a deal that would
have reduced the number of major players from three to two in many European Union
(EU) countries.5 9 The EC also blocked low-cost air carrier Ryanair's third attempt to
acquire Irish compatriot Aer Lingus.60 In contrast, it cleared Greek carrier Aegan Air-
lines' second attempt to acquire national rival Olympic Air, in light of Olympic Air's im-
54. Beijing Rui Bang Yong & Trade Co. v. Johnson (Shanghai) Medical Equipment Co., at 61-62 (Shang-
hai Higher People's Ct. Aug. 1, 2013).
55. Mao a Bamboo, Guangdong High Court of Final Appeal Ruling United IDC Huawei 20 Million Yuan Com-
pensation Constitutes a Conopoly, XNHUANET (Oct. 30, 2013, 9:33 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortne/
2013-10/30/c_117928934.htm.
56. The Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, EUR. COMMISSION (Oct. 12,
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/proposed directive en.html.
5 7. Draft Proposal for a Revised Block Exemption for Technology Transfer Agreements and for Revised Guidelines,
EUR. COMMISSION, (Oct. 6, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultalons/2013-technology-trans
fer/index en.html.
58. Towards more effective EU merger control, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (Oct. 6, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/consultations/2013_mergercontrol/index en.html.
59. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Prohibits Proposed Acquisition of TNT Express
by UPS - Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 30, 2013), availahle at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-
MEMO- 13 -48_en.hrm.
60. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Prohibits Ryanair's Proposed Takeover of Aer
Lingus - Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 27, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-
MEMO- 13 -144_en.htm.
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minent market exit.6 1 The EC also cleared the merger of U.S. Airways and American
Airlines, subject to slot releases. 62
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The EC has issued only one cartel decision thus far in 2013, imposing fines totaling
C141 million (approximately U.S. $189 million) against automotive wire harnesses suppli-
ers.
63 Vice President Almunia has announced that more fines are to be expected in the
ongoing car parts investigations. 64 Additionally, in its first ever decision concerning re-
verse-payment patent settlements, the EC imposed fines totaling C146 million (approxi-
mately U.S. $195 million) on Lundbeck and four generic pharmaceutical companies. 6
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The EC continued its investigation of Google's search and related advertising services
and has consulted on two rounds of commitments offered by Google to resolve the EC's
concerns.
66 The EC also continued its investigation of Motorola and Samsung concern-
ing standard-essential patents and market-tested commitments offered by Samsung. 67 On
the issue of net neutrality, the EC started investigating Orange, Deutsche Telekom, and
Telefonica based on the concern that these network providers may have favored their own
services and degraded access to competing services. 68 In the energy sector, the EC moved
forward with its probe into alleged excessive pricing by Russia's Gazprom.
69
61. Press Release, Fur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of Greek Airline Olympic
Air by Aegean Airlines (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 13 -92 7_en.hrm.
62. Press Release, Fur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Approves Proposed Merger Between US Airways
and American Airlines' Holding Company AMR Corporation, Subject to Conditions (Aug. 5, 2013), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 13-764 en.htm.
63. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Producers of Wire Harnesses _ 141 Million
in Cartel Settlement (July 10, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-IP-13-673-en.htm.
64. Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Comm'n Responsible for Competition Policy, Ad-
dress at the IBA 17th Annual Competition Conference: EU Competition Policy and Innovation (Sept. 13,
2013).
65. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Lundbeck and Other Pharma Companies
for Delaying Market Entry of Generic Medicines (June 19, 2013), availahie at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
releaseIP- 13 -563_en.htm?locale=en.
66. Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Comm'n Responsible for Competition Policy, Ad-
dress at the European Parliament Hearing: The Google Antitrust Case: What is at Stake? (Oct. 1, 2012).
67. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on Commitments Offered by
Samsung Electronics to Address Competition Concerns on Use of Standard Essential Patents - Questions
and Answers (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO- 13-910_en.htm.
68. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Unannounced Inspections in Internet
Connectivity Services (July 11, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-681 en
.htm.
69. Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Comm'n Responsible for Competition Policy, Ad-
dress at the Fordham's Competition Law Institute Annual Conference: Abuse of Dominance: A View from
the EU (Sept. 27, 2013).
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E. COURT DECISIONS
The EU Court of Justice confirmed that the EC can impose fines for antitrust infringe-
ments even if companies have received advice that the behavior is allowable from their
external counsel or from a national competition authority.70 The Court also confirmed
that an agreement to exclude a competitor from the market is illegal even if that competi-
tor is operating unlawfilly.71
VI. France
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The French Parliament is currently voting on a bill that would create an opt-in class
action mechanism for antitrust infringements.72 Only representative consumer associa-
tions could bring class actions and only after the French Competition Authority (FCA) or
the European Commission has issued a final decision.
B. MERGERS
Three transactions are especially worth mentioning. In Casino/Monoprix, the FCA
cleared Casino's acquisition of sole control of the retailer Monoprix (which had been
under joint control between Casino and Galeries Lafayette) after a phase two investiga-
tion. Due to the already significant market share of Casino in the Paris food retail market,
the clearance was made subject to divestment of more than fifty food retail outlets.73 In
the bricks market, the FCA cleared the acquisition of Imerys assets by Bouyer-Leroux,
subject to rather unusual behavioral commitments, i.e. a transfer of brick volumes to com-
petitors at cost price. 74 Finally, the acquisition by Eurotunnel (the operator of the Chan-
nel Tunnel) of three cross-channel ferries (from liquidated SeaFrance ferry company)
resulted in differing assessments on the two sides of the Channel. While the FCA only
imposed commitments preventing price discrimination between freight carriers, 7 5 the
U.K. Competition Commission went significantly further and ordered Eurotunnel either
to divest two ferries or be subject to a ten-year commitment not to operate a ferry service
from Dover in the U.K.76
70. Case C-681/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbeh6rde v. Schenker, 2013 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 4198 (June 18,
2013).
71. Case C-68/12 Protimonopolny urad Slovenskej republiky v. Slovenska sporitel'fia, 2013 ECJ EUR-Lex
LEXIS 3907 (Feb. 7, 2013).
72. Projet de loi 1357 du 13 septembre 2013 relatif a la consummation [Bill 1357 of September 16, 2013
Relative to the Consumer], available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/p1l357.asp.
73. Autorite de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], July 11, 2013, Decision No. 13-DCC-90, availa-
ble at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/13DCC90decision-version-publication.pdf.
74. Press Release, Autorite De La Concurrence, The Autoriete de la Concurrence Clears, Subject to Con-
ditions, the Acquisition of Imerys TC Assets by Bouyer-Leroux (July 26, 2013), available at http://www
.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id rub=483 &id article=2245.
75. Autorite de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], Nov. 7, 2013, Decision No. 12-DCC-154, availa-
ble at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/13DCC90decision-version-publication.pdf.
76. COMPETITION COMM'N, GROUPE EUROTUNNEL S.A. AND SEAFRANCE S.A. MERGER INQUIRY (June
6, 2013), available at http://www.competition-comnIission.org.uk/assets/competitioncomnIission/docs/2012/
eurotunnel-seafrance/final-repor -excised.pdf"
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The FCA imposed fines that totaled C79 million on distributors of commodity chemi-
cals for anticompetitive cartel behavior that included price coordination and customer
allocation.77 The FCA also imposed on MasterCard and Visa commitments to considera-
bly reduce interbank fees.7s
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The FCA imposed a fine of C40.6 million against Sanofi-Aventis, a French pharmaceu-
tical company, for implementing a strategy of disparaging generic versions of Plavix®, the




On June 30, 2013, the eighth amendment to the German Act Against Restraints of
Competition (ARC) entered into force.8 0 The amendment brings German competition
law more in line with EU law and introduces several changes to merger control, cartel
enforcement, and control of other abusive practices. The most significant change is the
introduction of the SIEC-Test, which replaces the "market dominance test."
Following a judgment rendered by the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) in the cement
cartel case,8 1 the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) published new fining guidelines on June 25,
2013.82 The new guidelines take into account that the FCJ interprets Section 81 (4) Sen-
tence 2 of the ARC-which caps the maximum amount of fines at 10 percent of the total
turnover of the company-as providing an upper limit within a framework of fines.
Within this framework, the FCO will consider 10 percent of the domestic turnover
achieved from the infringement during the infringement period as a starting point for the
77. Autorite de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], May 28, 2013, Decision No 13-D-12, available at
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/13dl2.pdf.
78. Autorite de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], Sept. 20, 2013, Decision No. 13-D-12, available
at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/13dl.pdf; Autorit de la Concurrence [Competition Au-
thority], Sept. 30, 2013, Decision No 13-D-18, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/
13d18.pdf.
79. Autorite de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], May 14, 2013, Decision No 13-D-11, available at
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/13d1.pdf.
80. Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des Geserz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen [GWB] [German
Act Against Restraints on Competition] Aug. 26, 1998, BGBL. I as amended Jun. 30, 2013, BGBL I at 26
(Ger.), availahie at http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/achte-novelle-gwb,property pdf
,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf.
81. See generally Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 26, 2013,
KARTELLBUfELDSACHE [KRB] 20, 2012 (Ger.).
82. See generally Richtlnien ffir die Festsetzung von Geldbulfien in Kartellbufigeldverfahren [Guidelines for
the Setting of Fines in Cartel Administrative Offence Proceedings], Jun. 25, 2013, Bundeskartellamt [Federal
Cartel Office] (Ger.), availahie at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/
Guidelines% 2 Ofor% 2 Othe% 20setting% 2Oofo 2O fines.pdf? blob=publicationFile &v= 3.
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calculation and will further take into account the size of the concerned company, as well as
aggravating and mitigating factors.
In addition, the German legislature created a Market Transparency Unit (MTU), for
Fuels at the FCO, that collects price information from oil companies and petrol station
operators and passes it on to consumers. The MTU started its normal operation on De-
cember 1, 2013.83
B. MERGERS
At the time of this writing, the FCO had issued two prohibition decisions for 2013. In
February 2013, the FCO prohibited plans by Kabel Deutschland to acquire cable network
operator Tele Columbus.84 According to the FCO, the disappearance of Tele Columbus
would have further strengthened the nationwide oligopoly of the two major regional cable
network operators, Kabel Deutschland and Unitymedia KabelBYW, in the retail TV ser-
vices market. Moreover, the FCO retroactively prohibited a transaction in the hospital
sector that was originally cleared with conditions, after hospital operator Asidepios, who
had planned to acquire a 10.1 percent stake in rival Rhan-Klinikum, had informed the
FCO that it no longer intended to comply with the conditions.85 In October 2013, the
German public broadcasting groups ARD and ZDF announced that they had abandoned
their plans to set up a joint online video platform called "Germany's Gold" that was re-
garded as problematic by the FCO.86 The FCO cleared the joint venture in 2011 but it
subsequently instituted cartel proceedings to examine potential anticompetitive effects
arising from the platform.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The FCO investigated Amazon8 7 and online hotel booking platform operator HRSss
for using a so-called best-price and price parity clauses.
83. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: MARKTTRANSPARENZ EINHEIT [BT] 17/10060 (Ger.), avaiahie at http://
dip2 1.bundestag.de/dip2 1/btd/17/100/1710060.pdf.
84. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Takeover of Tele Columbus by Kabel
Deutschland (Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Presse
nmitteilungen/2013/22 02 2013 KDG.hrml.
85. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Participation of Asklepios Group in Rival Rh6n-Klinikum Cleared
Subject to Condition (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/
EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/14 03 2013 AsklepiosRh6n.html.
86. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Plans for ARD/ZDF Online Platform "Germany's Gold" Abandoned
(Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Presseiitteilungen/
2013/16 09 2013 %20Germanys-Gold-aufgeben.html.
87. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Surveys Amazon Marketplace Sellers (Feb. 20,
2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/20-
02 2013 Amazon.html.
88. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Continues to View HRS's Best Price Clause Criti-
cally (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteil
ungen/2013/25 07 2013 HRS.hrml.
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Cartel cases resolved in the course of 2013 include manufacturers of household porce-
lain, fined approximately C900,000 (approximately U.S. $1.1 million);8 9 further fines on
rail manufacturers amounting to C100 million (approximately U.S. $130 million);90 manu-
facturers of drugstore products, C39 million (approximately U.S. $5.0. million);91 flour
mills, C65 million (approximately U.S. $83 million);92 and confectionary manufacturers,
C60 million (approximately U.S. $77 million).93
D. COURT DECISIONS
In an April 16, 2013, decision, the Higher Regional Court Diisseldorf increased the
fines imposed by the FCO on five members of the liquefied gas cartel from C1S0 million
to C244 million. 94 In another decision of August 14, 2013, the same court overturned the
FCO's clearance decision of December 15, 2011, concerning the acquisition by Liberty
Global of Kabel BW.95 Furthermore, the German Federal Constitutional Court held the
Section 81 (6) ARC, which authorizes interest charges for cartel fines, to be constitu
tional.96 Finally, in the above-mentioned decision in the cement cartel case, the FCJ con-
firmed the compliance of the fining provision with the German constitution. 97
VIII. India
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 2013, loss-making and failing banking companies were exempted from the purview
of merger control for five years. 98 The Competition Commission of India (CCI) amended
the merger control Regulations to exempt "creeping acquisitions," where the acquirer al-
89. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Concludes Cartel Proceedings Against Manufactur-
ers of Household Porcelain (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/
Meldung/EN/Presseiitteilungen/2013/17 10_2013_Haushaltsgeschirr.html.
90. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Punishes More Agreements Between Rail Manufac-
turers (July 23, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteil
ungen/2013/23 07 2013 Schienen.html.
91. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Clears Hospital Merger in Bergstralie Region (Mar.
18, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2 013/
18 03 2013 Bergstraf3 e.html.
92. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Concludes Proceedings Against Flour Mills and
Imposes Fines Totaling More than 65 Million Euros (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartel
lamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressenitteilungen/2013/19 02 2013 Miihlenkartell.hrml.
93. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt Imposes Fines of More than - 60 Million on Confectionery Manufac-
turers (Jan. 31, 2013), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteil
ungen/2013/31 01 2013 SC3%BCoC3%o9Fwarenhersteller.html.
94. Press Release, Dfisseldorf Higher Regional Court Increases Fines Against Liquefied Gas Cartel
(Apr.16, 2013), availahie at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Presseiitteilungen/
2013/16 04 2013 FlC3%BCssiggaskartell-OLG.html.
95. Oberlandesgericht Dfisseldorf [OLG Dfisseldorf] [Higher Regional Court Diisseldorf] Aug. 14, 2013,
VI Kart 1/12 (V) (Ger.).
96. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 19 2012, 1 BvL 18/11 (Ger.).
97. See generally Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 26, 2013, Kartellbuf3geldsache
[KRB] 20, 2012 (Ger.).
98. MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, NOTIFICATION F. No. 5/63/2011-CS (Jan. 8, 2013), available at
http://cci.gov.in/images/media/notifications/S.O.o2093 0/20(E)_08012013.pdf
VOL. 48
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTITRUST 53
ready holds 25 percent to 50 percent of the shares/voting rights.99 Intra-group transac-
tions, where one enterprise has more than 50 percent shares/voting rights in the other or
where an enterprise holds more than 50 percent shares/voting rights in both parties to the
transaction are also exempt, provided there is no change in control.100
B. MERGERS
The CCI imposed penalties of U.S. $79,085 on Temasek' 0 ' for delayed notification and
of U.S. $158,170 on Titan.I°2 Non-compete obligations in transactions were allowed so
long as they are reasonable in terms of duration, business activities, geographical areas,
and person(s) subject to the restraint. 0 3
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
Evidence on the basis of "preponderance of probabilities" was considered sufficient to
prosecute parties involved in a cartel.104 The CCI also recognized the legitimate role of
industry bodies, finding that collective action by the members is not per se anti-
competitive. 105
The CCI imposed a penalty on the Board of Control for Cricket in India for abusing its
dominant position. 0 6 It also held that the Department of Industrial Policy and Promo-
tion is an "enterprise" under the Act while playing the role of policy-maker for foreign
direct investment, whereas in earlier decisions it held that Central Bureau of Narcotics
and Ministry of Civil Aviation were not enterprises due to their non-commercial regula-
tory and policy-making functions.10
99. The Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to the Transaction of Business Relating
to Combinations) Regulations, 2011, Gazette of India, 17 (as amended Apr. 4, 2013).
100. Id.
101. See Competition Comm'n of India, Combination Registration No.C-2013/06/124 (Aug. 1st, 2013),
available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/P-C-2013 -06-124.pdf.
102. See Competition Comm'n of India, Combination Registration No. C-2013/02/109 (Apr. 2, 2013),
available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C- 2013-02-109.pdf.
103. See Competition Comm'n of India, Combination Registration No.C-2012/09/79, 4 (Dec.21, 2012),
available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2012-09-79.pdf; Com-
petition Comm'n of India, Combination Registration No. C-2013/04/116, 8-9 (June 20, 2013), availahie at
http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C- 2013-04-116.pdf.
104. See Competition Comm'n of India, M/o Commerce v. Puja Enterprises & Ors, Ref. Case No. 01 of
2012, 12-13 (Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2 011/OrderOfCommission/012012.pdf.
105. See Competition Comm'n of India, Advertising Agencies Guild v. Indian Broadcasting Federation,
Case No. 35 of 2013, 4-5 (une 1, 2013), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/352013
.pdf.
106. See Competition Comm'n of India, Surinder Singh v. Board of Control for Cricket in India, Case
No.61 of 2010, 36, 39 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2Ol1/OrderOfCommission/612010
.pdf.
107. See Competition Comm'n of India, Vineet Kumar v. Ministry of Corp. Affairs, Case No. 18 of 2013, 4
(Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/182013.pdf, Competition
Comm'n of India, Om Prakash v. CBN & Ors, Case No. 41 of 2013, 6 (Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://cci
.gov.in/May201 1/OrderOfCommission/412013.pdf.
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D. COURT DECISIONS
The Competition Appellate Tribunal held that CCI must provide reasons and consider
mitigating circumstances while imposing penalties.0s It also held that the "relevant turn-
over" of a company must be considered while imposing penalties.10 9
IX. Israel
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Israel enacted a new block exemption (which includes a self-assessment mechanism) for
non-horizontal arrangements without price restrictions." 0
The Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) published draft guidelines for the enforcement of
excessive pricing (Draft Guidelines),"' which reflect a new approach toward monopoly
pricing. According to the Draft Guidelines, the prohibition in the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Law 5748-1988 (the Law) on "unfair pricing" does not apply to predatory pricing
only, but also to excessive pricing. The Draft Guidelines include a "safe harbor," whereby
the IAA will not initiate enforcement actions against a monopoly that does not set its
prices above 20 percent of its manufacturing costs.
A legislative proposal amending the Law was published, empowering courts to award
treble damages." 2
The IAA published draft guidelines concerning the transfer of information between
competitors prior to a merger (e.g. during due diligence) that indicate that this practice
may constitute a restrictive arrangement." 3
B. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The General Director of the IAA (General Director) published a Determination-a
decision that serves as prima facie evidence in any legal proceeding-declaring a global
cartel existed in the electricity infrastructure sector (GIS)." 4 It also issued hearing notices
to members of alleged cartels in three alleged oligopolistic markets; and, a draft of opera-
tive provisions with respect to one of the alleged concerted groups, Ashdod and Haifa
108. See Competition Appellate Tribunal, Ideal Indus. Explosives Mfrs. & Others v. CCI & Ors., Appeal
No. 82 of 2012, 57 (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://compat.nic.in/upload/PDFs/aprilordersApp2013/
18_04 13.pdf.
109. See Competition Appellate Tribunal, M/s Excel Corp. and Ors. v. CCI, Appeal No. 79 of 2012, 40 (Oct.
29, 2013), available at http://compat.nic.in/upload/PDFs/octordersApp2013/29-10-13.pdf.
110. Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988, LSI 15a (2014) (Isr.).
111. See generally Press Release, General Dir. of the Israel Antitrust Auth., The IAA Draft Guidelines on the
Enforcement of Excessive Pricing (Oct. 31, 2013).
112. Draft Bill Amending the Restrictive Trade Practices Law (No. 14), 2013, HH 801 (Isr).
113. Press Release, Gen. Dir. of the Isr. Antitrust Auth., The IAA Draft Guidelines on the Disclosure of
Info. Pursuant to Due Diligence Prior to a Transaction Between Competitors (Mar. 14, 2013).
114. Press Release, Gen. Dir. of the Isr. Antitrust Auth., Determination Pursuant to Section 43(a) of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Law Regarding a Restrictive Arrangement Between Gas Insulated Switchgear
Producers (Sept. 16, 2013).
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ports." 5 For the first time the General Director considered taking enforcement measures
for "price squeezing."" 6 The General Director published a Determination that a re-
cycling corporation abused its position by preventing one of its customers from entering
the market.I
7
The Supreme Court upheld the major banks' appeals of a District Court's decision to
certify a class action regarding an alleged cartel with respect to interest rates and ordered
the case be reheard by the District Court.I 8 The District Court indicated that when a
competing company becomes a minority shareholder in a rival company, anti-competitive
concerns arise, and there may be unlawful conflicts of interest between the minority share-
holder and the company." 9
X. Mexico
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In June 2013, the Mexican government enacted a major constitutional amendment on
telecommunications and competition. 120  The most significant highlights are the
following:
* The creation of a new Federal Economic Competition Commission (FECC) as a
constitutional and autonomous entity, whose budget will directly allocate from the
Congress, replacing the Federal Competition Commission, which was a de-concen-
trated agency under the Mexican Ministry of Economy. As such, its budget was allo-
cated directly by the Ministry of Economy.
* The appointment of seven new Commissioners, instead of five, as in the former com-
petition agency.' 2 '
* The creation of the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (FIT) as the authority
responsible for competition matters and sectorial regulation with respect to the tele-
communications sector.
115. Press Release, Gen. Dir. of the Isr. Antitrust Auth., The Gen. Dir. Published a Draft of Operative
Provisions to the Members of Concentration Groups Pursuant the Restrictive Trade Practices Law (Nov. 7,
2013).
116. Press Release, Gen. Dir. of the Isr. Antitrust Auth., The JAA is Considering to Determine that Bezeq
Abused Its Position As a Monopoly in the Internet and Tel. Mkt. (Feb. 11, 2013).
117. Press Release, Gen. Dir. of the Isr. Antitrust Auth., The Gen. Dir. Published a Determination: The
Recycling Corp. Owned by the Big Drinks Cos. Abused Its Position As a Monopoly to Exclude a Competitor
(July 14, 2013).
118. CA (Jer) 3259/08 Sharnoa Computerized Machines Tel-Aviv Ltd. v. Hapoalim Bank Ltd. [2013] (Isr).
119. DC (TA) 18327-12-11 Chemipal Ltd. v. NeoPharm Ltd. [2013] (Isr).
120. See generally Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de los Arfculos 6o.,
7o., 27, 28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constimci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en Materia de
Telecomunicaciones [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of Articles 6o, 7o, 27, 28, 73,
78, 94 and 105 of the United Mexican States' Political Constitution Regarding Telecommunications Matters],
as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO] 11 de Junio de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.dof.gob
.nnx/nota detalle.php?codigo= 5301941&fecha= 11/06/2013..
121. Id. (On September 11, 2013, the FECC and the FIT began their functions. In the case of the FECC,
the Plenum-deciding body-is integrated by six economists and only one lawyer, indicating an inclination
towards an economics-focused approach in competition cases.).
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* The establishment of the indirect amparo 22 as the sole remedy available against the
FECC's and FIT's final resolutions before the specialized courts.
* The inclusion of must carry and must ojfer obligations to require free-of-charge relay
of open-air TV signals under specific conditions.123
B. MERGERS
Up to November 2013, the FECC124 has completed 93 merger reviews, 92 of which
were authorized and only one denied.12 5 Among the most relevant concentrations re-
viewed by the FECC were (i) the global transaction between Nestle S.A. and Pfizer Inc.,
authorized with conditions on April 4, 2013; (ii) the transaction between Nestle S.A. and
Aspen Labs, S.A. de C.V. related to the compliance of conditions in the Nestle-Pfizer
merger, authorized on August 20, 2013;126 (iii) the merger between Sherwin-Williams
Company and Avisep, S.A. de C.V., denied on October 29, 2013, in the resolution of the
motion of reconsideration;127 and (iv) the merger between Cadena Mexicana de Exhibi-
ci6n, S.A. de C.V. and Cinemark Holdings Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V., authorized on
October 22, 2013.128
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Up to November 2013, the FECC had initiated four investigations for absolute monop-
olistic practices-three related to the sale of auto parts in Mexico (air compressors, angle
sensors, and automotive harnesses) and the fourth one related to the commercialization of
corn in Colima, Mexico.' 29
On September 10, 2013, the FECC fined six hospitals in Jalisco, Mexico and their em-
ployees for the amount of MXN 14 million (approximately U.S. $1,069,873) for con-
ducting collusive practices in the market of services granted by hospitals and/or medical
services establishments. The practice involved fixing prices of medical services covered by
insurance companies from 2009 to 2011 and was performed by the managers of the hospi-
122. Id. art 28. (There are two sorts of amparo proceedings, the direct amparo, which proceeds against final
judicial resolutions, and the indirect amparo, which proceeds against final resolutions by non-judicial
authorities.).
123. Id. (Whereby open-air TV operators must allow the retransmission of their signals by pay TV opera-
tors, and the former must retransmit such open-air TV signals.).
124. The Federal Competition Commission up to June 2013 and afterwards the FECC. For purposes of
this report, they are indistinctively referred to as the FECC.
125. See Asuntos Resueltos [Resolved Issues], COMISION FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA EcONOMICA, http://www
.cfc.gob.nux/cofece/index.php/sesiones/asuntos-resueltos (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
126. Letter from Ali B. Haddon Ruiz, Exec. Sec., Comisi6n Federal de Competencia, to Guillermo Gonza-
lez Camarena, Aspen Labs & Nestle (Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://www.cfc.gob.nux/cfcresoliciones/
docs/Concentraciones/V489/39/1763153.pdf
127. COMISION FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, EXPEDIENTE CNT-095-2012, PLENO DE SHERWIN-WIL
LIAMS COMPANY Y AVISEP, S.A. DE C.V., available at http://www.cfc.gob.nx/cfcresoliciones/docs/Concen
traciones/V486/38/1760928.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). This concentration also was denied by an initial
FECC's resolution issued on July 11, 2013; the parties submitted a motion of reconsideration against it, but
the FECC confirmed its original resolution.
128. Mexico Aprueba Compra de Cadena Cinemark [Mexico Approves Purchase of Cinemark Chain], GESTION
(Nov. 13, 2013) http://gestion.pe/empresas/mexico-aprueba-compra-cadena-cinemark-2080947.
129. See Asuntos Resueltos, supra note 125.
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tals and the Asociacion de Hospitales Particulares deJalisco. In this case, the FECC conducted
a dawn raid on the hospitals, obtaining relevant evidence that was key to finding
liability.130
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
Up to November 2013, the FECC had decided seven investigations for relative monop-
olistic practices, three of which concluded with fines.' 3 ' As part of those investigations, on
August 20, 2013, the FECC issued a resolution to fine State-owned oil refining Pemex-
Refinaci6n for iVXN 653.2 million (approximately U.S. $50,207,532) for selling fuel to
gas stations subject to the condition of hiring transportation services for gasoline and
diesel.132
In October 2013, and as a result of the above-mentioned reform on telecommunications
and competition, the FECC formally transferred to the FIT the files of pending cases
related to telecommunication matters which were being carried out with the previous




In 2013, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia (FAS Russia) prepared draft laws,
known as the Fourth Antimonopoly Package, that would significantly amend the federal
law "On the Protection of Competition" (Competition Law).' 33 The amendments to the
Competition Law relate to merger control, dominance, vertical agreements, and the pow-
ers of the competition authorities. The abolishment of the federal law "On Natural Mo-
nopolies" and the inclusion of provisions concerning state regulation of the activity of
natural monopolies into the Competition Law are planned for the near future.
B. MERGERS
In recent years, the number of applications submitted to antimonopoly authorities
within the merger control procedures has steadily declined. At the same time, the admin-
istrative burdens for businesses engaging in merger activity continue to remain high. As a
solution to this problem, it has been suggested that the grounds requiring post-merger
notifications should be limited.
130. CFC Multa con 14 MDP a Seis Hospitales de ]alisco por Practicas Monopolicas [CFC Fined 14 Million Pesos to
Six Hospitals in ]alisco for Monopolistic Practices], PROCESO (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.proceso.com.nx/
?p=352391.
131. See Asuntos Resueltos, supra note 125.
132. Impone Comisidn Multa a Pemex por 653 Millones [Commission Fines Pemex 653 Million], EL DiAmao MX
NACIONAL, http://diario.mx/Nacional/2013 -08-25 113263a7/impone-comision-multa-a-pemex-por-653-
millones/# (Pemex challenged this resolution through an indirect amparo trial; its outcome is pending.).
133. Federaliyj zakon Rossijskoj Federacii ot 26 ifil 2006 g. N 135-FZ (0 Zasite Konkurencii) [Federal
Law of 26 July 2006 No. 135-FZ (On Protection of Competition)], SOBRANW ZAKONODATEL'STVA Rossus
KOI FEDERATSI [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 31 (Russ.).
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Cartel enforcement continued to be one of FAS Russia's priorities. In recent years,
cooperation between competition authorities and the police has strengthened and contin-
ues to actively develop.
On June 18, 2013, the State Duma of the Russian Federation in its first hearing ap-
proved the draft of the federal law "On Amending Article 178 of the Criminal Code."'134
This draft places an obligation on FAS Russia to provide to the police all materials regard-
ing violations of antitrust law that may contain evidence of criminal activity. Further-
more, the draft makes changes to the law "On Intelligence Investigations," which gives
FAS Russia the ability to utilize the results of police investigations.
Finally, 2013 was the first year in which FAS Russia investigated several international
cartels.
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
Looking back at the period from 2010 to 2012, there was a steady increase in the number
of revealed violations of Article 10 (the abuse of dominant position) of the Competition
Law. In 2013, FAS Russia kept its focus on the liberalization and streamlining of existing
regulations and law enforcement and prefers to issue warnings before the actual initiation
of proceedings against dominant entities.' 35
E. COURT DECISIONS
In 2013, the courts considered remarkable cases against oil companies, transport com-
panies, credit companies and insurance organizations. According to FAS Russia, the ma-
jority of decisions rendered by the competition authorities have been upheld by the courts.
Importantly, in respect of the court system, in the near fiture the introduction and
establishment of group claims for protection of the rights and legitimate interests of a
group of persons and the indemnification mechanism in the "multiple size" may be
initiated.136
XII. South Africa
The South African competition authorities were active in 2013. In particular, the Com-
petition Commission concluded numerous matters, most significantly a major cartel in-
134. See Proekt Federalogo Zakona ,0 Vnesenii I menenij v Statu 178 Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Rossijskoj Federacii,
[Draft Federal Law "On Amending Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation"], FED. ANTIMONO
POLY SERV. (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.fas.gov.ru/legislative-acts/legislative-acts 51154.html.
135. See Press Release, Fed. Antimonopoly Serv. of the Russ. Fed'n, The Head of FAS Igor Artemyev: The
Institute of Warnings Showed Good Results (Sept. 24, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/
news_32478.html.
136. See Press Release, Fed. Antimonopoly Serv. of the Russ. Fed'n, Rossijskim Kompaniam Grozat iski o
Milliardnyh Ubytkah [Russian Companies Are Threatened By Lawsuits, Billions In Losses] (Apr. 19, 2013),
available at http://fas.gov.ru/fas-in-press/fas-in-press 3 745 1.html.
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vestigation into the construction industry, despite leadership and staffing changes at the
authority. 137
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Section 6 of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009, which empowers the Compe-
tition Commission to conduct market inquiries, took effect on April 1, 2013. In addition,
the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 (FMA) amended Section 18(2) of the Competition
Act 89 of 1998 to oust the Commission's jurisdiction to assess mergers, which require
approval in terms of the FMA.138
B. MERGERS
A novel condition requiring a ten-year licensing of a brand was imposed by the Compe-
tition Tribunal in relation to Nestle's acquisition of Pfizer's infant nutrition business.139
The only merger prohibited in 2013 was a small merger between Van Schaik and Juta
Bookshops.140
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Commission concluded settlement agreements with fifteen firms in the construc-
tion industry that admitted to collusive tendering. The firms agreed to penalties collec-
tively totaling R1.46 billion. This was the culmination of the Commission's "fast-track"
construction settlement process, which began in February 2011.141 Civil damages actions,
as well as possible criminal complaints, may arise from the contraventions. The Commis-
sion also published draft terms of reference for a market enquiry into the private health-
care industry. The enquiry is expected to commence at the start of 2014.142
137. The South African Competition Commissioner was forced to resign in October 2013 and was replaced
by an acting Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner resigned earlier in the year and was replaced by two
acting deputy Commissioners. Both the Chief Economist and the Head of Mergers resigned in 2013 and
have not yet been replaced.
138. Competition Amendment Act of 2009 § 6 (S. Mr.); GN 70 of 1 Feb. 2013 (S. Aft.).
139. See Nestle SA and The Infant Nutrition Business of Pfizer Inc., Case No. 65/LMIJunl2-015248 (Competi-
tion Trib., Mar. 18, 2013) available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/65LMun12 -015248.pdf.
140. See Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Aft., Comm'n Blocks Van Schaik From Acquiring Juta
Bookshops (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/Commission-blocks-Van-
Schaik-from-acquiring-juta-Bookshops.pdf.
141. See Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., Construction Firms Settle Collusive Tendering
Cases With R1.5 Billion In Penalties (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/
AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Constructi6on-Fast-Track-Settlement-Process-Media-Release.pdf; see also Con-
sent Orders, COMPETITION TRIBUNAL, http://www.comptrib.co.za/cases/consent-order/ (last visited Mar. 23,
2014).
142. See COMPETITION COMM'N OF S. AFR., NOTICE 116 OF 2013, TERms OF REFERENCE FOR MARKET
INQUIRY INTO THE PRIVATE HEALTHCARE SECTOR (Nov. 29, 2013), available at http://www.compcom.co
.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Government-Gazette-ToR.pdf.
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D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
The Commission reached a landmark settlement agreement with Telkom, the fixed-line
telecommunications operator, which was accused of margin-squeeze in the leasing of ac-
cess lines to internet services providers. The settlement requires Telkom to pay a fine of
R200 million and to adopt numerous policies to avoid discriminatory and exclusionary
practices.143
The Tribunal heard a number of abuse of dominance complaints in 2013, including (i)
the Commission's complaint against South African Breweries (SAB) for discriminatory
pricing and various other prohibited practices; 144 (ii) the Commission's complaint against
Sasol Chemical Industries relating to excessive pricing; and (iii) the Commission's com-
plaint that media group Media24 engaged in predatory pricing.
45
E. COURT DECISIONS
In the case of Competition Commission v. Yara (SA)(PT) Ltd.,146 the Supreme Court of
Appeal (SCA) significantly reduced the procedural requirements imposed on the Commis-
sion to formally initiate a complaint and then ensure that its subsequent referral matches
the terms of the initial complaint.
Both the SCA 147 and Constitutional Court 148 made way for class actions in cases dealing
with applications for certification for instituting actions against the participants in the
bread cartel. The High Court also confirmed that the Tribunal can certify that the con-
duct of the leniency applicant in the cartel was a prohibited practice.' 49
In the case of Competition Commission of SA v. ArcelorMittal SA Ltd.,150 the SCA found
that a leniency application was subject to litigation privilege, but that privilege was waived
by the Commission when it referred to the contents of the application in its founding
papers. The SCA therefore required the Commission to make the leniency application
and its record available to the respondents to enable them to plead.
143. See Non-Confidential Order, Competition Commission of South Africa v. Telekom Ltd., No. 016865, 2013
(Comp. Trib) p. 8 para. 5.2, availahle at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/O16865-Telkom.pdf (S.
Mr.).
144. See Amanda Visser, SAB Distrihution Deals Harm Independens, Tribunal Hears, BusINEss DAY BDLrvu
(July 22, 2013, 2:27 PM), availahie at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/retail/2013/07/22/sab-distribution-
deals-harm-independents-tribunal-hears.
145. See Media24 Faces Competition Commission, Bus. REP., (Oct. 31, 2013, 1:48 PM), available at http://www
.iol.co.za/business/comparies/media24- faces-competition- commission- 1.160013 7#.Uu2O9KXnbns.
146. Competition Commission v. Yara 2013 (6) SA 404 (SCA) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/
cases/ZASCA/2013/107.pdf.
147. Children's Resource Centre Trust v. Pioneer Food 2012 ZASCA 182 (SCA) (S. Mr.), available at http://www
.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments/sca_2012/sca2012 -182.pdf.
148. Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods Ltd. 2013 ZACC 23 (CC) (S. Mr.), available at http://www.constitutional
court.org.za/site/MU.K.A.htm.
149. Premier Foods Ltd. v. Norman Manoim NO. 2013 ZAGPPHC 236 (HC of S. Aft.) available at http://
www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/38235-2012.pdf.
150. Competition Commission of South Africa v. Arcerlormittal South Africa Ltd. 2013 ZASCA 84 (SA) at 15
para. 37 (S. Aft.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Compelflon-Commission-v-
Arcerlormittal-final-680-12.pdf.
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The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 came into force.151 The legislation
creates a new, single competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority
(CMA), to replace the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission
(CC).152
B. MERGERS
The CC required airline Ryanair to reduce its 29.8 percent stake in airline Aer Lingus
down to 5 percent. 153 This was accompanied by obligations on Ryanair not to seek or
accept board representation or acquire firther shares. The CC decided to prohibit the
anticipated merger of two hospitals, finding that the proposed merger would give rise to a
substantial lessening of competition in a range of hospital services. 154
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The OFT has issued a Statement of Objections to a number of pharmaceutical compa-
nies alleging that they acted to delay effective competition in the supply of paroxetine, an
antidepressant medicine.' The allegations concern so-called "pay for delay" agreements.
The OFT also announced that on-line retailer Amazon decided to end its price parity
policy, which restricted its Amazon U.K. Marketplace sellers from offering lower prices
on other online sales channels.156 The OFT consulted on commitments put forward by
two online travel agents (OTAs) and InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG), which were
designed to address the OFT's competition concerns about the online offering of room-
only hotel accommodation bookings by OTAs. 157
151. See generally Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, availahle at http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukpga/2013 /24/pdfs/ukpga_20130024_en.pdf.
152. Id. at 42.
153. Press Release, Competition Comm'n, Competition Commision Requires Ryanair To Sell Shareholding
In Aer Lingus Down To 5 Per Cent (Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.compeftion-commission.org.uk/
media-centre/latest-news/2013/Aug/cc-requires-ryanair-to-sell-shareholding.
154. Press Release, Competition Comm'n, CC Makes Final Decision On Hospitals Merger (Oct. 17, 2013),
available at http://www.competition-comnission.org.k/media-centre/latest-news/2013/0ct/cc-makes-final-
decision-on-hospitals-merger.
155. Investigation into Agreements in the Pharmaceutical Sector, OFF. OF FAIR TRADING (Apr. 19, 2013),
available athttp://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTw-ork/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98-current/pharmaceutical/.
156. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Welcomes Amazon's Decision to End Price Parity Policy
(Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/60-13.
157. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, OFT 1500, HOTEL ONLINE BoomrNt: NOTICE OF INTENTION To Ac
CEPT BINDING COMMITMENTS TO REMOVE CERTAIN DISCOUNTING RESTRICTIONS FOR ONLINE TRAVEL
AGENTS AND INVITATION TO COMMENT (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/ca-
and-cartels/oft 1500.pdf.
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D. COURT DECISIONS
The U.K. Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) awarded damages in a private claim for
abuse of dominance.1 8 The claim was based on the finding, also made by the CAT, that
water company Dwr Cymni infringed the U.K. prohibition on abuse of dominance (it was
therefore a "follow-on" claim).159 The English High Court granted interim injunctions in
two cases concerning an alleged refisal to supply by Barclays Bank plc.160
XIV. United States
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) codified the so-called "pull and refile," an infor-
mal practice under Hart- Scott-Rodino Act review that allows a notification to be with-
drawn at the end of the statutory waiting period and refiled without having to pay a new
filing fee (thus allowing the FTC more time to consider a notification in hopes of avoiding
a second request). Now, the procedure may be used only once, and only where (i) the
proposed acquisition does not change in any material way, (ii) the resubmitted notification
is recertified and updated, and (iii) the resubmitted notification is refiled within two busi-
ness days of the withdrawal.161
B. MERGERS
The Department of Justice (DOJ), six state attorneys general, and the District of Co-
lumbia challenged the proposed merger between US Airways Group Inc. and American
Airlines' parent corporation, AMR Corp. The combined company would have control of
69 percent of the take-off and landing slots at Reagan National Airport in Washington,
D.C. and would also have a monopoly on 63 percent of that airport's nonstop routes. The
complaint alleges that a combined company would result in increased ticket fares and
ancillary fees and would make it easier for the remaining carriers to coordinate fee
increases. 162
158. See generally Albion Water Limited v Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig, [2013] CAT 6 (Eng. & Wales), available
at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/238-7977/judgment.html.
159. See generally Albion Water Limited & Albion Water Group Limited v. Water Services Regulation Au-
thority, [2006] CAT 36 (Eng.), available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/237-610/1046-2-4-04-Albion-
Water -Limited-Albion-Water-Group-Limited.html.
160. See generally Dahabshiil Transfer Services Ltd. v Barclays Bank and Harada Ltd. v. Barclays Bank,
[2013] EWHC 3379 (Ch.) (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EW THC/Ch/2013/3379.html.
161. 16 C.F.R. § 803.12 (2013).
162. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Challenging Pro-
posed Merger Between US Airways and American Airlines (Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://www.justice
.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13 -at-909.html.
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The DOJ Antitrust Division's ongoing auto parts investigation yielded additional guilty
pleas by nine companies and two executives, as well as more than $740 million in fines.163
It also altered its approach to naming uncharged third-party wrongdoers in corporate
immunity deals in cartel cases. As of April, the DOJ (i) no longer carves out of non-
prosecution protection provisions employees for reasons unrelated to culpability and (ii)
no longer includes in the plea agreements the names of carved-out employees, instead
listing them in a sealed appendix) 64
D. ABUSES OF DOMINANCE
Marion HealthCare LLC, an outpatient surgical center, sued hospital network South-
ern Illinois Healthcare and insurance provider Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Illinois. The
complaint alleged that the defendants substantially suppressed competition for outpatient
surgical services through exclusionary agreements, exclusive price dealing, price discrimi-
nation, and monopolization. The court dismissed the complaint on the basis of market
definition but gave Marion permission to partly amend its complaint.165
E. COURT DECISIONS
In F. T. C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a gov-
ernment entity acting pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy to displace competition can be exempt from the antitrust laws but only where the
anti-competitive effect was a foreseeable result of the State policy.166 This significantly
changes the rules for government-owned hospital transactions and will undoubtedly im-
pact the types of transactions we see in this space going forward.
163. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nine Automobile Parts Manufacturers and Two Executives
Agree to Plead Guilty to Fixing Prices on Automobile Parts Sold to U.S. Car Manufacturers and Installed in
U.S. Cars (Sept. 26, 2013), availahie at http://www.jusice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2013/300969.pdf.
164. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer on Changes
to Antitrust Division's Carve-Out Practice Regarding Corporate Plea Agreements (Apr. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13- at-422 .html.
165. Marion Healthcare LLC v. S. Illinois Healthcare, 12-CV-00871-DRH-PMF, 2013 WL 4510168 at
*11, *15 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013).
166. F.T.C. v. Phoebe Punmey Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1007, 1011 (2013).
SPRING 2014
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
